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STANDARDS, LAW, AND GOVERNANCE*
 
LAWRENCE BUSCH
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
 
ABSTRACT
The last several centuries have been marked first by a tendency toward the use of standards to standardize,
and then by the use of standards to differentiate. Both have been built on the legal edifice of the state. More
recently, in response to the rapid rise of neoliberalism, standardized differentiation has increased in scope and
has become part of a larger Tripartite Standards Regime (TSR) consisting of standards, certifications, and
accreditations. Over the last half century, the TSR has grown to cover nearly every aspect of social life. In
many ways this new form of governance replaces and transmutes positive law, which is a product of the state,
with its market equivalent. Yet, the TSR leaves much to be desired as a form of governance. The recent
financial collapse should give us pause to ask whether the path we have constructed for ourselves can lead us
to the desired destination.
 
As Michel Callon (1998; Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007) and others (e.g.,
MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007) have argued, economies are performed. Put
differently, without people engaged in certain relatively well-defined and organized
activities, economies simply do not exist. Moreover, from this perspective,
economists not only study economies, measuring various aspects of their
performance; through their theoretical perspectives, measurement devices, and
policy initiatives, they propose and enact particular ways to perform the economy.
Thus, there is a necessarily reflexive character to economics. The words and actions
of economists tend themselves to be used to (re)shape the economy. Furthermore,
just as a play may be performed in a way that is faithful to the script, may be
performed well or badly, may be a brilliant production or a dismal failure, so may
economic performances. 
Markets have been around since the beginnings of recorded history and perhaps
before. People produced various things for their own use. Whatever was left over,
despite quality, they attempted to sell in the market if a buyer were available. If not,
they kept those things so that they might try to sell them again later. 
The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged.*
This work is part of the Research Programme of the ESRC Genomics Network at Cesagen (ESRC
Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics). This paper was initially presented at a
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Then, much later, after the invention of money, some people determined that
they could produce for the market, using the money they received to purchase the
means of subsistence. To do this, they had to have expectations, however vague,
about what a typical potential buyer might wish to buy. These expectations were
based on everyday knowledge about their community and about those desiring and
having the means to purchase a given item. 
It is this form of market that was central to (the various enactments of) classical
liberalism (i.e., a market in which producers of a given good produce for the market
and prices are set by virtue of their competition). This is the market of Hobbes’s
([1651] 1991) ‘harmless liberties,’ of Locke’s ([1690] 1955) Civil Government, and
especially of Smith’s ([1776] 1994) Wealth of Nations. 
It is one in which the state provides a legal framework designed to ensure,
among other things, (1) enforcement of contracts, (2) a citizenry made up of free
laborers, perhaps with some minimal amount of formal education, (3) a good system
of transport (to ensure that goods and people can move freely), and (4) prohibition
or regulation of monopolies. By the late nineteenth century, the older feudal legal
systems in which ‘just price’ had prevailed had been abandoned. Most of these
conditions were met throughout the industrialized world. Arbitrary seizure was
abolished; laborers were no longer bound to the land; canals, railroads, and roads
became commonplace public goods; and many monopolies were either broken up or
regulated. Of course, writing long after Smith, Marx (1906) was quick to note that
such markets were unstable and tended toward monopoly, that the owners of capital
were far better served in such a system than were workers, and that the very
process of work itself was transformed by the market in often undesirable ways. 
By the late nineteenth century, this type of market was beginning to show signs
of wear. Large companies were commonplace. While some goods were still
produced for the market, others were beginning to be tailored for particular market
segments, for certain target groups. And, as Mitchell (2008) argued, in the mid-
twentieth century the economy was invented, the product of new measurement
tools and forms of calculation, new property rights and other legal frameworks, and
new prescriptions as to the proper forms of economic behavior – in short by
remaking the world such that ‘the economy’ could be performed. Yet that is to get
ahead of the story.
Of particular importance for the story I wish to tell here are two profound but
largely unnoticed changes that have occurred over the last several centuries that
have transformed both markets and law: the use of ‘voluntary’ standards first to
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standardize, and then to differentiate.  Both were very much helped along by changes1
in our understanding and practice of markets themselves, understandings and
practices very much central to the discipline of economics. In this paper I attempt
to document those changes. First, I examine the use of standards to standardize.
Then, I turn to how standards have been used to differentiate. Next, I examine how
responses to the rise of neoliberalism triggered the rise of what is called the
Tripartite Standards Regime (TSR) of standards, certifications, and accreditations.
I conclude by arguing that the recent financial collapse should give us pause to ask
whether the path we have constructed for ourselves can lead us to the desired
destination. I begin by discussing the rise of standardization.
TOWARD UNIFORMITY
The advent of standardization was already foreseen in the work of Adam Smith
([1776] 1994). Much has been said about Smith’s description of the division of
labor, and in particular his description of a pin factory. Yet, most commentators
have ignored two peculiar aspects of Smith’s analysis. First, the division of labor
Smith described was unusual at the time; most non-agricultural goods were
produced at the request of a particular buyer and often to the specifications
demanded by the buyer. Hence, if Smith had looked at other industries of his day
– cabinet making, wrought iron work, wagon manufacture – nowhere would he
have found the minute division of labor that he described. Second, the pins that
Smith described were standardized. Each had to be of approximately the same
length. Each had to have a head of approximately the same size. Each had to be
sufficiently sharp at one end to penetrate the cloth and not so wide as to tear it. It
is to Smith’s credit that he understood that the world that would follow him would
be a world in which the minute division of labor would be employed to produce
standardized commodities for the market, rather than singularities for particular
persons. It would be an industrial world (Boltanski and Thévenot [1991] 2006).
Not surprisingly, it was the military that first expressed an interest in
standardization. Standards for uniforms made it easy to distinguish friend from foe
and were widely used by 1800. Simultaneously, they presented the illusion that
soldiers were themselves ‘uniform’ and hence replaceable. Similarly, standards for
armaments would restrict the power of the guilds, permit control of vast armies of
workers, and produce interchangeable parts, to ensure that bullets were of a
Clearly, this is not the sole story that can be told of the last several centuries. Marx (1906) told1
that story as one of class struggles, while Weber ([1922] 1978) emphasized the role of bureaucracy.
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standard caliber and that firearms could be easily repaired on the battlefield.  In2
1790, Honoré Blanc demonstrated the interchangeability of musket parts to an
astonished audience at the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris. Similarly, in 1815, the U.S.
Congress contracted with Simeon North to produce 100 pistols with standard parts
(Coulson 1944). However, the difficulties involved are illustrated by the difficulties
faced by James Watt, who struggled to find someone who could bore a cylinder
with sufficient accuracy to make his steam engine function.
Still, despite those costly and heroic efforts, it was not until the mid-nineteenth
century that standardization began to take hold – standardization that became
widely known as the American system (Coulson 1944; Habakkuk 1962). Before
then, producing standard parts for anything was simply both too difficult and too
costly. Hence, manufacturers produced items that looked the same, that functioned
in the same way, but that were anything but the same.
Simultaneously, by the mid- to late-nineteenth century a move was afoot to
transform markets such that they began to resemble those in the textbooks of
economics. Likely the transformation was partly the result of economic theorizing,
and the theorizing was partly a response to these changes. In any case, a series of
discrete events took place in industrial nations that transformed the nature of
markets. These included state action to: 1) produce a single currency for each nation,
backed by a national bank, 2) ensure the precision and accuracy of weights and
measures used in commerce, 3) prohibit or regulate monopolies, and 4) regulate
stock markets by establishing clear trading rules. Simultaneously, but largely
beyond the province of the state, 5) prices were marked on consumer goods to
suppress haggling and speed up the pace of sales,  6) national standards bodies were3
created, beginning in 1900 with the formation of the British Standards Institution,
and 7) mass production of a vast array of intermediate and consumer products
became commonplace. By 1900, the enthusiasm for standardization was nearly
unbounded. Moreover, it ran across the political spectrum. Consider the positions
of three typical proponents of standardization: Ford, Hoover, and Veblen.
Obviously, Henry Ford saw standardization as a means of increasing the
efficiency and turnover rate in his rapidly growing automobile business. Ford’s
enthusiasm for standardization was perhaps best summed up in his well-known
comment that buyers could have any color vehicle they wanted, as long as it was
For a detailed analysis of the changes and the resistance they encountered in France, see Adler2
(1997; 1998).
This is still noted in the names of French retailers such as Monoprix and Prisunic.3
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black. Yet it went far beyond that. Workers would perform tasks repeatedly in a
standardized way, based on Frederick Winslow Taylor’s (1911) notions of scientific
management. Moreover, they would live standardized lives, monitored by the
company’s Sociological Department (Hooker 1997). In short, Ford would have
standardized vehicles, standardized workers, and standardized production
processes. Ford saw himself as engaged in a process of social uplift, providing the
astounding wage of five dollars per day to unskilled workers, and helping them to
live clean, upright, moral, American lives. Charlie Chaplin (1936) may have
effectively satirized this approach in his film Modern Times, but Ford’s profits
overshadowed Chaplin’s critique.
At the opposite end of the political spectrum stood radical economist Thorstein
Veblen. As he put it (1904:10), “. . . modern industry has little use for, and can make
little use of, what does not conform to the standard. What is not competently
standardized calls for too much of craftsmanlike skill, reflection, and individual
elaboration, and is therefore not available for economical use in the processes.”
Moreover, Veblen did not stop at the production of manufactured goods. He was
quite convinced of the need to standardize all of the services associated with
commerce – accounting, billing, and contracting. Even consumers would be
standardized, conforming to the choices posed by the new markets for mass-
produced consumer goods. Everyone, everything would be interchangeable. 
One might ask how a committed radical could find this situation at all desirable.
Nevertheless, Veblen was convinced that the revolution would be led by the
engineers. The capitalists distrusted the engineers, and the engineers were more
concerned about efficiency than they were about profits (Veblen 1921). With rising
class consciousness among the engineers, they would take over and increase
productivity by 300-1200 percent. Workers would align themselves with an
‘Executive Council of Engineers,’ a ‘Soviet of technicians’ who would push aside the
absentee owners of capital, ushering in a new era of worker control and material
abundance.
Between the positions taken by Ford and Veblen was that of Herbert Hoover.
An engineer by training, Hoover also appreciated the importance of
standardization. He was concerned about class divisions and saw standardization
as a means to overcome them. Instead of class war, standardization would resolve
class divisions by eliminating waste and ushering in a new age of abundance. In
short, by lowering the costs of goods, standardization would make wages go further
without lowering the profits of capitalists. Hoover (1952:28-29) explained it best in
his memoirs:
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It involved increasing national efficiency through certain fundamental
principles. They were (a) that … social progress required, as a first step,
lowering the costs of production and distribution by scientific research and
transformation of its discoveries into labor-saving devices and new articles
of use; (b) that we must constantly eliminate industrial waste; (c) that we
must increase the skill of our workers and managers; (d) that we must
assure that these reductions in cost were passed on to consumers in lower
prices; (e) that to do this we must maintain a competitive system; (f) that
with lower prices the people could buy more goods, and thereby create more
jobs at higher real wages, more new enterprises, and constantly higher
standards of living [that would] … provide every safeguard of health and
proper leisure.
Moreover, as a public servant, Hoover could put many of his ideas into practice. He
was Food Administrator during World War I, Secretary of Commerce under
Harding, and finally President (1929-1933). In each instance, he encouraged the use
of voluntary standards to standardize or simplify production  and to eliminate4
waste. Importantly for our purposes here, Hoover emphasized the limits of law and
how voluntary standards, enacted by industry, might supplement the law. Indeed,
from his perspective, voluntary standards arrived at through democratic means
would instill in persons the necessary moral obligations they had to society, thereby
solving most problems if sufficiently encouraged; the state would need to intervene
only to deal with those persons and organizations that were somehow incorrigible.
This is not to say that there were no detractors. Some noted that
standardization would rapidly lead to monopolies by reducing all competition to
price competition (Hoyt 1919). Whichever company had the greatest economies of
scale would capture the market. Others argued that standardization under
capitalism would be far more stifling than it would be under socialism (Robson
1926).
Still, standardization was also pushed because of mishaps in the First World
War on both sides (Tate 2001). All too frequently the combatants discovered that
parts or ammunition were of the wrong dimensions. As a result, most industrialized
nations began to see standardization as central to their national security. As the
Many persons on both the left and right were uncomfortable with Hoover’s emphasis on4
standardization, fearing a tedious, boring existence. Hoover used the term ‘simplification’ as a means
to overcome those concerns.
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(U.S.) National Industrial Conference Board (1929:14) noted, “ . . . national
standardization committees are associations that have been organized, largely since
the war, in practically every important industrial country.” They bolstered private
efforts to standardize.
It should be noted here that the very processes of enactment of new legal
regimes (e.g., antitrust, anti-fraud) and of standardization of products often made
actual markets resemble more closely those described in idealized form in political
economy and later economics texts, irrespective of the political persuasions of their
authors. Consider, for example, the equivalence among market objects that were
commodified. Mid-nineteenth century Chicago provides several examples (Cronon
1991). First, by developing standard grades for grain and treating it as a liquid, it
became possible to trade grain sight unseen, as well as to develop futures markets
(Lee 1937). Second, animals could be slaughtered in standardized ways in
(dis)assembly line fashion, and shipped vast distances in refrigerated rail cars
(Giedion [1948] 1975; Swift 1927). Finally, by switching from post and beam to
balloon frame construction, lumber could be cut in standard sizes such that
materials for a standard home could be bought as a package and delivered to a
construction site far from any forest (Sprague 1981).
Similarly, the work needed to engage in production of standardized goods was
itself standardized. Henceforth, the equivalence among workers in fields as diverse
as slaughtering and machine production made it possible to measure something as
abstract as ‘labor.’ Finally, the equivalence of units of land was made possible by
cadastral surveys that divided land into standard units and by the development of
crop and even varietal monocultures over vast areas of land (Hill 1991; Willis
1938). 
These changes were noticed by commentators as different as Karl Marx and
Alfred Marshall. In each instance, these new equivalences made it possible to
calculate, to employ the tools of mathematics so successfully used in the natural
sciences, not merely to analyze the dynamics of markets but to bring them into
being. Simultaneously, the results of these analyses could be and were used to
justify various actions by both legislators and the owners and managers of
companies.
By 1930, the advantages of standardization were so well-established that nearly
every industrialized nation had a national standards development organization;
today nearly every nation on earth has one (Loconto and Busch 2010). Moreover,
they are linked together by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), thereby ensuring a certain level of standardization globally.
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DIFFERENTIATING THROUGH STANDARDS
Yet, even as the great obsession with standardization was getting underway in
the late-nineteenth century, a countertrend was emerging: the use of standards to
differentiate. The beginnings can be found in Henry J. Heinz’s 1892 decision to
advertize that his company processed 57 different varieties of pickles, and in the
creation of mail order businesses, especially the extremely profitable Montgomery
Ward, founded in 1872 (Cronon 1991), and Sears, Roebuck, & Company, which
began catalogue sales in 1897 (Anderson 2006). In both cases, they permitted the
sale of a vast variety of goods, each of which was standardized. For Sears, some
200,000 different items, many of them variants on the same product, were made
available to the residents of rural America. By the 1930s, Alfred Sloan of General
Motors would use the same approach to produce a wide range of automobiles, each
of which was standardized, yet differed from the others in myriad ways. Even the
paints used in the production of automobiles were subjected to standardized
differentiation, shifting from the black pioneered by Henry Ford, and then briefly
to 11,500 uncontrolled colors, before finally settling on 290 “carefully selected hues’’
(Blaszczyk 2007).
Importantly, this new form of differentiation did not hearken back to the days
of craft production. Instead, it depended on the use of standardized industrial
methods to produce differentiated goods. Differentiated standard goods could be
made sufficiently different from others as to make price comparison difficult.
Moreover, differentiated goods, could (partially) escape the tyranny of price
competition by fragmenting the market. 
Finally, standardized differentiation allowed – indeed, encouraged – people to
differentiate themselves from others, although this was initially true only of the
upper classes. The buyer of a Cadillac could differentiate him or herself from the
buyer of a Chevrolet, but even in industrialized nations the average person still had
few choices. 
Responses to the Great Depression considerably slowed the emergence of
standardized differentiation, promoting instead the growth of the welfare state in
democratic nations and eventually promoting Nazism and fascism as well. Put
differently, the depression and the Keynesian response increased the demand for
cheap, standardized products (sometimes produced in nationalized factories) as well
as for standard government services, rather than encouraging further use of
standards to differentiate.
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Of course, not everyone was comfortable with the growing role of the state.5
Among those concerned was University of Chicago economist Henry C. Simons
([1934] 1948). He argued that simply keeping the state out of the market as
asserted by the classical liberals was insufficient; a program of positive law was needed
to ensure that most goods and services would be distributed by the market rather
than the state. A few years later, American journalist Walter Lippmann (1938)
proposed a renewed liberalism that would provide an alternative to both Nazism
and Soviet Communism. Philosopher Louis Rougier was sufficiently impressed by
Lippmann’s work that he had it translated into French (Lippmann 1937) and
organized a conference in 1939 to discuss it (Travaux du Centre International
d'Etudes Pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme 1939). There the word ‘neoliberalism’
was coined, and there was widespread agreement on several points. First, the
failures of liberalism were not due to an inherent tendency of capitalism toward
monopoly, but rather to special interests using the state to meddle in markets.
Second, there was a slippery slope between the welfare state and totalitarian
regimes. Finally, promoting a laissez-faire economy was no longer sufficient; what
was needed was state intervention “au sens contraire.” 
Of course, World War II plunged Europe, and eventually much of the world
into chaos and destruction. Moreover, by the end of the war, it appeared that the
welfare state – based in large part on large-scale, mass production of standardized
goods and services as well as equally standardized state services – was
unchallenged. Not only were unemployment and education the provinces of the
state, but a complex tangle of subsidies, price ceilings, public monopolies, direct
state ownership, and other regulation organized economies in important ways. 
After the war, the neoliberals regrouped as the Mont Pelerin Society (2006).6
Its key theorists, F. A. Hayek (1973; 1976; 1979) and Milton Friedman (1962), were
both convinced that the antidote to Statism was the market. What was needed was
a return to the principles of classical liberalism, but with a twist: constitutional
principles needed to be put into place that would ensure the dominance of the
market even as they limited the role of the state.
What eventually came to pass in the performance of the neoliberal model was
neither a conspiracy launched by a few economists, nor a perfect enactment of the
theories themselves, but a mostly satisfactory performance of the model largely
For an overview of the rise of neoliberalism, see Harvey (2005). For an analysis of the5
distinction between American and German versions, see Foucault (2008) and Megay (1970).
For an excellent history of the Mont Pelerin Society, see Mirowski and Plehwe (2009).6
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embraced by the owners of financial and corporate capital. Of particular import for
our purpose is the rise of a new legal framework for international governance
consisting of, for example, the World Trade Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the World
Bank.  Simultaneously, regional trade organizations began to appear (e.g., NAFTA,7
Mercosol, ASEAN) that further limited state power. 
Together these organizations have used international law to significantly limit
national sovereignty in the name of free trade. Simultaneously, various leaders in
each of the industrialized nations have themselves attempted, with varying degrees
of success, to dismantle the welfare state – Reagan in the United States, Thatcher
in the United Kingdom, and more recently (and less successfully) Sarkozy in
France. In each instance, the assertion has been that the state was itself an
impediment to economic growth, the source of many economic problems plaguing
the economy, and notoriously inefficient when compared (usually) to an idealized
conception of the private firm.
Despite Reagan and Thatcher, arguably the neoliberal perspective(s) remained
one contender among several until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. That
collapse profoundly affected Western elites. Lacking competition from the Soviets,
there was little reason to maintain the welfare state. In particular, owners of
financial and industrial capital began to understand that many changes proposed by
Hayek and Friedman would have direct positive financial consequences for them.
Put differently, neoliberal theory justified removal of postwar welfare state policies,
growth of freedom to operate (FTO) in the marketplace, and creation of a nearly
global marketplace.
In short, the rise of neoliberalism has involved both the dismantling and
rewriting of national laws and the development of new bodies of law that are often
international in scope. Still, even as FTO has been welcomed by multinational firms
and those firms aspiring to become multinational, it tended toward destabilization
even before the recent global financial crisis. Put differently, the largest firms have
found themselves faced with issues of governance that were largely unforeseen by
either management experts or neoliberal theorists. Similarly, NGOs have found it
necessary to change their tactics considerably. Standards have been a central feature
of that response.
The World Bank was of trivial importance until the debt crisis. In recent years, it has become7
particularly effective at dismantling the state structures of so-called developing nations in the name
of development. What this has meant, in large part, is the opening of these nations to new forms of
penetration by private capital. See Goldman (2005) for a detailed analysis.
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WHO NEEDS LAW? GOVERNANCE BY THE MARKET
From the perspective of the neoliberals – and unlike classical liberals – the
market is the most effective and efficient governing mechanism. Unlike the state,
which requires central planners and planning, the market operates based on a
different epistemology. Specifically, central planning requires that the planner
understand all the relevant variables and how they interact to produce a given
outcome. Yet, as the numerous critics of Enlightenment philosophies have pointed
out, knowledge is not so constructed. That is to say, the knowledge held by any
individual or group is always limited, incomplete, and error-ridden. In contrast, to
act in a market one need not know how a given price was arrived at; the market
does its magic resulting in a particular price. Whether that price is the result of
poor weather, transport difficulties, or inadequate supply is of no consequence. It
is this feature of markets that makes them attractive to neoliberal thinkers.8
Nevertheless, in a world in which markets are given (relatively) free reign, in
which large, multinational firms have their FTO, in which state intervention is
limited by law, greater volatility and a greater focus on short-term profits are the
order of the day. Over the last 25 years, firms have developed two parallel and
interrelated strategies to adapt to this new economic regime: (1) the organization
of firms into supply chains, and (2) the growing use of standards, certifications, and
accreditations as flexible means of building on the market-friendly regulations now
enshrined in black letter law (i.e., the law found printed in legal tomes). Together
they avoid the horror vacui of the market. In short, while an increasing interest in
standards can be traced back to the late-nineteenth century, the use of standards to
differentiate became an imperative as neoliberalism was enacted.
As I have discussed supply chain management (SCM) elsewhere at length
(Busch 2007), I will only mention it briefly here. SCM involves management at the
level of the supply chain rather than the firm. Some supply chains are managed by
downstream actors (usually retailers) and others by upstream actors (usually
suppliers). The idea is relatively simple: to manage the flow of goods and services
through the entire chain to maximize efficiencies within the chain, to offload
unprofitable and uncontrollable aspects to others, and (usually) to optimize the
profits of the so-called supply chain captain (i.e., the firm that organizes the chain
itself). 
Long before most of the contemporary postmodern thinkers, Hayek rejected Hobbes’s all-8
knowing Leviathan and understood that knowledge is distributed. But at the same time, Hayek
believed that the price system provided a solution to this dilemma, by distributing both knowledge
and incentives to action in an efficient manner. See, in particular, Hayek (1945).
11
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A variety of tactics may be employed to further the aims of the chain, including
lobbying governmental bodies, suing competitors, alignment with NGOs, displays
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and, most importantly for the discussion
here, enactment of standards for all actors in the chain. In short, SCM is a strategic
approach to performing the neoliberal economy. It eschews the spot market, links
all suppliers tightly together through legally binding contracts and/or the promise
of continuing sales, and relies heavily on standards. 
Standards play a particularly important and growing role in the new neoliberal
economy as they often replace formal legal frameworks with far more flexible and
responsive (from the perspective of the firms employing them) law-like rules and
regulations (cf. Anderson 2006). These differentiated standards allow firms to
discipline suppliers as well as to reduce the pressures of price competition. The key,
from the vantage point of a given firm, is to buy standardized and sell differentiated.
In so doing, one can have many firms compete to provide a standardized product
to you, but sell a differentiated product at a premium to whomever is next in the
supply chain.
Political scientists have labeled these sorts of relationships ‘Non-State Market-
Driven’ (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004). They are
non-state in that those promulgating the standards are firms, consortia of firms, or
NGOs. They are market-driven in that the sanctions involved for noncompliance
are not enforced by the state, but by the market. Yet it is precisely this fact that has
to date made this form of governance largely invisible. After all, jurists and political
scientists often focus their research on the state and its (usually singular) legal
frameworks, while most sociologists and anthropologists often focus on issues other
than governance. Economists do study markets, but whether neoclassical or
neoliberal in their perspective, they rarely acknowledge that different forms of
market governance might yield different outcomes (cf. Samuels 2004). 
However, standards by themselves are hardly sufficient to constitute a new
governance regime. Increased international sourcing and competition combined
with standardized differentiation bring with them a renewed concern with the
quality of goods (Thévenot 1997). Thus, effective governance through standards
requires several additional features usually found in legal regimes. These include
clear sanctions and a system for governance of the standards themselves. Over the
last thirty years, just such a system has arisen, paralleling the formal legal system.
We call this the Tripartite Standards Regime (TSR) (Loconto and Busch 2010).
TRIPARTITE STANDARDS REGIMES
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TSRs consist of standards, certifications, and accreditations. Over the years, a
complex network of institutions has arisen that produces each of these. As noted
above, by the mid-twentieth century, nearly every nation then extant had a national
standards body creating a virtual alphabet soup of acronyms (e.g., AFNOR, ANSI,
BSI, DIN, NIN),  in addition to hundreds of specialized standards-development9
organizations. The status of these bodies was and remains variable, with some state
agencies, some private, and some recipients of substantial state aid. Moreover, in the
aftermath of World War II, international standards bodies were established (e.g.,
ISO). As these bodies were established, some system obviously had to be put into
place to certify that those who claimed to follow the standards actually did so.
Three parallel approaches were developed, each of which is still in use today. First-
party certification involves the seller certifying to the buyer that the product meets
the standard. Second-party certification involves the buyer checking to ensure that
the good or service offered by the seller meets the standard. Third-party
certification (TPC) involves an apparently disinterested third party doing the
checking and reporting those results to both buyer and seller. It is this latter form,
TPC, that has become dominant (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 2005). It has the
distinct advantage of separating the process of certification from the negotiations
over the sale itself. Put differently, it allows the buyer to avoid being both buyer
and policeman simultaneously. However, the very process of TPC poses another
problem: How are we to know that a given certifier is reliable?
The solution to this problem has been to create accreditation bodies (i.e.,
organizations that accredit certifiers, attesting to their conformity to the proper
standards of certification). Initially, accreditors were often product- or industry-
specific (e.g., for education, health care, electrical equipment). While the first
national general accreditation body was established in Australia in 1947, their
numbers only began to increase in the early 1980s; today more than 60 exist
(Donaldson 2005). Like national standards bodies, some of these are public, some
private, and others quasi-private. In addition, several international general
accreditation bodies have emerged including the International Accreditation Forum
(IAF) and the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC). The
former accredits national accreditation bodies, while the latter accredits national
accreditors of scientific laboratories. 
In a particularly ironic move, the very international institutions created to limit
the power of the state have promoted the development of these national and
For a list of national standards organizations, see WorldwideStandards.com (2010).9
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international bodies to regulate the global flow of goods by assuring their identity!
In other words, trade between Firm " in Country A and Firm $ in Country B is
made far easier if both know that what each calls a blue widget is, in fact, a blue
widget. Yet, given the proliferation of many different standards, this requires a
complex bureaucracy and an ever-growing structure of rules to ensure that this is
the case. As Adler (1998:528) has argued, “The price of standards is eternal
vigilance.”
Together, these standards, certification, and accreditation bodies form what we
call a TSR. They engage collectively in what is known within the industry as
‘conformity assessment,’ and they use the denial of access to a given market as the
sanction enforcing conformity. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that they consist of
a system of market-led governance that is parallel to, although ultimately
dependent on, the legal frameworks provided by states. Moreover, the very
existence of TSRs shows the limits of the neoliberal perspective: Instead of limiting
the state, the state-led promotion of ‘the market’ and market-like institutions has
created a Hydra-like form of governance that is fully dependent on the state but
that largely escapes the confines of law. This is hardly the kind of ‘spontaneous
order’ about which Hayek wrote.
One reaction to this turn of events has been that NGOs, acknowledging the
limits of their efforts to lobby a more restricted state, have opted to confront the
larger firms directly. Some observers believe that this new mode of governance may
tame global corporations (Conroy 2007). Hence, organizations as diverse as the
Rainforest Alliance and the Fairtrade Labeling Organization have shifted their
energies toward pressuring large firms and even aligning themselves with those
firms when it appears prudent. Yet, as NGOs have rushed to embrace the TSR, they
have ironically opted to accept the essential outlines of the neoliberal model of the
state and market (Guthman 2008; Nawyn 2011).
LAW GONE SOFT: LAW AND THE NEOLIBERAL UTOPIA
Despite these profound changes, most lawyers and jurists have been particularly
uncomfortable going beyond black letter law. While a great deal of effort has been
expended to explicate and clarify such black letter law, in terms of both court
decisions as well as legal hermeneutics, it has been largely assumed that only
nation-states can make law. Hence, standards and the entire TSR have been largely
invisible to the legal profession as a whole. Yet, simultaneously, more lawyers are
involved in (1) rewriting positive law such that it restructures institutions as
markets or quasi-markets, (2) interpreting standards for larger organizations,
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especially insofar as they are embedded in contracts, and (3) in settling the growing
number of legal actions growing out of standards disputes. 
Yet, to paraphrase Shakespeare, a law by any other name is still a law. The
entire Anglo-American terminology for standards as ‘soft law,’ now commonly used
in the international community, is quite misleading. While doubtless there are
aspects of soft law that are unenforced or unenforceable, this is hardly the case for
the TSR. Those who violate the rules of the TSR are heavily penalized by a denial
of market access; they are often forced out of business. As Higgins and Tamm
Hallström (2007:686) put it, “[s]tandards bodies now rank with global market
mechanisms and the hierarchical organizations they spawn, to form a power
triangle that produces the coordination and orderliness in socio-economic affairs
which were once the responsibility and privilege of state functionaries.” 
Furthermore, while democratic states generally have some sort of
Montesquieuian division of powers, TSR rules-formulation, execution, and appeals
processes are often centralized and rarely open to those outside the corridors of
corporate power. For example, when NGOs or journalists find that a Wal-Mart
supplier is not enforcing labor standards, Wal-Mart simply ends the relationship,
thereby avoiding a public relations disaster, but also closing a factory and putting
many persons out of work. In contrast, Ikea works with its suppliers to remedy the
problem, but certainly not going as far as to encourage an independent employee
union (Christopherson and Lillie 2005).
In addition, the apparent intent behind various certifications is often lost as
conformity to the rules trumps resolution of a problem (e.g., Ponte 2009). The
result is what Michael Power (1997) calls ‘rituals of verification.’ Such verifications
include the use of checklists and paper audits to determine whether standards are
followed (Marsden, Flynn, and Harrison 2000), as well as writing the rules so that
key problems are ignored. For example, Bain (2010) has shown how conformity to
pesticide-exposure standards is easily achieved, but leaves most female temporary
workers virtually unprotected. Similarly, Hatanaka (2010) showed the lack of
objective and effective governance in an organic shrimp network.
Moreover, as should be apparent to the reader by now, the entire neoliberal
assertion that the political state must be reduced in size is undermined by the
growth of (1) new international regulatory bodies of enormous scope and
complexity, (2) market-based regulatory bodies whose operation has the force of
law, even if nominally described in terms of voluntary standards, and (3) the
rewriting of extant bodies of law to enclose more of the commons and to make more
markets and market-like structures possible. Furthermore, these newly emergent
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institutions are often far less accountable than comparable institutions in
democratic states. 
There is something Orwellian here. The market utopia of neoliberalism in which
each of us is, as suggested in the title of Milton and Rose Friedman’s (1980) book,
“free to choose,” at the very same time a burden imposed on each of us that has the
potential to be far more sinister – even if largely unintended – than many a nation
state. If freedom from the relatively straightforward and often redressable burdens
of state regulation means submission to the myriad burdens of market regulation,
then we may have lost more than we have gained. Standards are laws; the market
is the state.
IS THE PARTY OVER? PROSPECTS FOR A JUST WORLD
The recent events that have now led to global recession and perhaps worse may
signal the death knell for neoliberalism. Their destabilizing effects are now
becoming painfully apparent. Ironically, many of the very same politicians who
enthusiastically embraced neoliberal policies have since found themselves forced to
address some of its excesses. The securitization of mortgages was in itself a brilliant
idea. It made mortgages available at reasonable rates to millions of persons.
Adherents to the neoliberal position had an abiding belief in the idea that there is
simply ‘the market’ which is by definition efficient. For them, there were not myriad
forms that markets might take, each the result of perhaps carefully-crafted, but
never perfect, rules and regulations. Hence, bankers were encouraged to accept
securities on what amounted to little more than blind faith. The complex financial
TSRs simply did not alert bankers (or anyone else) to the dangers ahead. As it
turned out, the entire edifice of mortgage lending in the United States and the
United Kingdom turned out to have been a house of cards. The incentive structure
that was developed encouraged ill-advised behavior at best, and illegal behavior at
worst. The privatized Fannie Mae (originally the Federal National Mortgage
Association) and Freddie Mac (originally the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation), once no longer U.S. government entities, instead became interested
parties eager to gobble up the seemingly endless volume of financial paper
emanating from the banking sector. Recently, the U.S. government had to
renationalize these entities – entities that should have never been privatized in the
first place.10
Another complementary view was recently proposed by André Orléan (2009). He argued that10
financial markets can never be ‘efficient’ in the same way as product markets, because those who run
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Furthermore, while there is little doubt that a small global elite has become
extremely wealthy, and that the middle class has benefitted from lower prices for
a cornucopia of goods and services produced in the volatile global economy, income
distribution in many nations has become far more skewed after decades of moving
toward greater equality. Moreover, those at the very bottom of the economic ladder
have recently experienced hunger and even starvation as food prices soared largely
(although certainly not entirely) because of speculation in a poorly regulated global
food market. In short, it may be that the party is over, that the ebullience expressed
by proponents of neoliberalism will now be far more muted. 
Yet, we do not have the luxury of going back to the world of the 1960s. Nor was
that world ideal in any sense. However, there are lessons to be learned from the
excesses brought on by neoliberalism. I suggest the following:
1. The neoliberal attempt to use law to minimize the state has been largely a
failure in its own terms. Although states have been reorganized such that many
functions are now delegated to the private sector, government bureaucracies
have hardly withered. Furthermore, non-state bureaucracies have grown. Yet,
all modern markets must depend on states to protect against fraud, enforce
contractual relations, limit monopolies, and protect the rights of participants.
In addition, a myriad of regulations are necessary to protect us from dangerous
products, unsafe foods and pharmaceuticals, quack physicians, and the like. The
current crisis illustrates the central role that the state must play in the financial
sector.
2. It is far from clear that the TSR as presently constituted offers a solution to the
problems of governance that confront us collectively. To the extent that we
cede aspects of governance to the TSR, it appears that we also cede to a small
group of experts and other interested parties any semblance of democratic
control. Hoover’s belief that standards can be developed by democratic means
– despite claims by standards bodies to the contrary – has to date not been
borne out in practice. Indeed, various consortia and alliances have arisen to
short-circuit the far-from-perfect standards-development organizations (Cargill
and Bolin 2007).
3. Since markets are human creations like all other institutions, they can take
many forms. Markets can promote virtues or vices according to how they are
institutionalized. Indeed, some markets are clearly criminogenic (Ericson,
Barry, and Doyle 2000; Farberman 1975). Enacting markets involves iteratively
them have little or no incentive to look more carefully at what they are trading.
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developing legal, regulatory, and standards frameworks that are more nuanced,
that recognize that the devil is truly in the details. 
4. The distinction between law and ‘voluntary’ standards is at best overwrought.
Standards now often have the force of law (and some laws are far weaker than
many standards). Thus, it is imperative that jurists and social scientists ask new
questions that transcend the arbitrary boundary between black letter and soft
law. 
5. Finally, we need to abandon the absurd notion that a single vision, a single
imaginary, a single image of the future will resolve the world’s problems. Hayek
was clearly right in stressing the finitude of human understanding; he was
equally wrong in thinking that markets would provide the singular best possible
solution to all human ills. Despite our best attempts to escape judgment, to
develop singular solutions to all problems that can be achieved by market or
state formulae, judgment appears to be part of the human condition; we need to
learn to live with it.
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